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Research in experimental and behavioral game theory has revealed a substantial and
persistent degree of heterogeneity in the strategic behavior of real individuals. While the
prevailing theoretical explanations of the observed heterogeneity typically invoke underly-
ing diﬀerences in beliefs among the population of players, we argue that a further source
of heterogeneity may consist in the individuals’ diﬀerent ability to process information, of
which short term memory capacity provides a measurable proxy. Research in cognitive
psychology has shown that individuals typically diﬀer in their short term memory capacity;
furthermore, short term memory capacity provides a fundamental cognitive bottleneck to
our ability to process information eﬃciently and hence seems correlated with performance in
a variety of problem solving and reasoning tasks. In this paper we conduct experiments on
a set of well-known games whose solution concepts require the application of some paradig-
matic forms of strategic reasoning, such as iterated dominance and backward induction.
We separately conduct standard short term memory tests on our subjects to detect the
presence of a correlation between individuals’ behavior in the games - here deﬁned in terms
of degrees of conformity to the standard game-theoretic prescriptions - and their short term
memory score.
Our results show the presence of a signiﬁcant and positive correlation between subjects’
short term memory score and conformity to standard game-theoretic prescriptions in the
games, thus conﬁrming our hypothesis. While the robustness of our conjecture awaits
to be conﬁrmed by further data gathering in more interactive experimental settings, our
preliminary results suggest a promising line of inquiry on the interconnections between
information processing capacity and strategic behavior.
11 Introduction
Bounded rationality is about the limits of human information processing; it is not a generic
deviation from the “olympic” rationality of neoclassical economics, but the result of intrinsic
limitations in our cognitive architecture. It is resource-limited, not data-limited (Norman and
Bobrow, 1975). In opposition to the widespread emphasis on the scarcity of information, Her-
bert Simon repeatedly argued that the most important problem is quite often abundance of
information, given our limited processing capacities (Simon, 1978).
Within such view, a key research task is to single out the processing bottlenecks responsible for
bounded rationality, to ﬁnd parameters characterizing them, and to assess how such parameters
aﬀect cognitive performance. Simon criticized psychologists for directing too much eﬀorts to
hypothesis testing and too little attention to parameter evaluation (Simon, 1981). And he had
little doubt that the most important constraint aﬀecting human information processing is short
term memory capacity.
The bottleneck (...) must lie in in the small amount of rapid-access storage (so-called
short-term memory) available and the time required to move items from the limited
short-term memory store to the large-scale long-term store” (Simon 1996, p.61)
Short term memory (STM) plays a central role in Simon’s view of the human information
processing architecture. In his joint work with Allen Newell (Newell and Simon, 1972), he
attributes to STM the key role of holding the input and output symbol structures of elementary
information processes, thus being directly involved in all kind of processing activities.
While Simon himself dedicated some experimental research to STM (Simon, 1978 and 1989),
his prototypical examples were from the domain of “toy” problem solving puzzles and learning
tasks. There seems to be a surprising lack of research dedicated to the impact of STM capacity on
economic interactive behavior. The recent resurgence of interest in bounded rationality among
economists doesn’t ﬁll this gap. Attempts at modeling “limited recall” and memory on deci-
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Models trying to incorporate tradeoﬀs between computational complexity and rationality come
closer by introducing explicitly the cost of information processing by ﬁnite automata (Abreu
and Rubinstein, 1988). Complexity arises because automata have very limited working memory
capacity. However, while in these models working memory capacity aﬀects the execution of a
strategy, it doesn’t aﬀect the thinking process by which a strategy is designed. Even more,
such models typically assume that individuals can control complexity and have no constraints in
making an accurate economic assessment of the costs and beneﬁts of increasing complexity.
Experimental economists provide a more sympathetic view. A few experimentalists (e.g.,
Nagel 1995; Ho, Camerer and Weigelt, 1998) have suggested that individuals may diﬀer in terms
of the number of iterated steps of thinking they may perform. Since strategic reasoning in games
usually implies some kind of recursive thinking, individual diﬀerences in the ability to perform
the steps of such recursion may explain behavioral heterogeneity. While STM constraints are
not usually mentioned (see Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2001 for an exception), they are natural
candidates to explain diﬃculties in retaining the results of former reasoning steps while new steps
are being performed.
The well-documented variance in individual STM capacity (Baddeley, 1990) suggests a poten-
tially relevant source of heterogeneity in the cognitive and behavioral performance of individuals.
While there is a growing attention to agents heterogeneity in game-theoretic modelling, it is usu-
ally assumed that such heterogeneity arises from diﬀerences in preferences, in the decision rules
adopted and in beliefs about the behavior of others (e.g., Costa-Gomez, Crawford, and Broseta,
2001; Stahl and Wilson, 1995). We instead suggest that diﬀerences in information processing
capacity may be a stable source of heterogeneity in interactive behavior.
In this paper we report some preliminary, exploratory results from a broader research project
aimed at evaluating the impact of STM capacity on strategic behavior. In a related experiment
(Devetag and Warglien, 2001), we have investigated a task in which subjects had to construct
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mon normal form games. We found signiﬁcant correlation between individual STM capacity
and subjects’ ability to construct correct representations of relational structures of increasing
complexity - this hints at the fact that the individual ability at editing a correct mental repre-
sentation of a game might be aﬀected by STM constraints. In the experiments reported here, we
investigate the relations between STM capacity and individual rationality in solving games that
require diﬀerent forms of iterated reasoning. We consider only games of perfect information, in
which deviations from rationality cannot be attributed to a lack of information, but only to how
information is encoded and processed. We ﬁnd that STM capacity is signiﬁcantly correlated to
individual performance in such games.
The concept of a short term memory has been a subject of considerable controversy in the
psychological literature (see Baddeley, 1990 for a classical discussion). However, while the exis-
tence of a separate, central psychological store of short term memory has been widely debated,
there is a considerable consensus on the existence of STM phenomena revealing a limited capac-
ity to store temporarily information while performing more complex cognitive tasks, and on the
individual variability of such capacity. We will not deal here with the deeper psychological (and
neurological: e.g., Cohen et al., 1997) issues raised by the former controversy - more pragmati-
cally, we will only be looking at measures of STM capacity as a proxy of individual information
processing bounds.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 brieﬂy describes the games that were presented
to subjects; section 3 describes the experimental design; section 4 presents the results and ﬁnally
section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The Games
We selected three simple instances of games whose solution concepts require the application of
some form of iterated reasoning. In all of the games, subjects had to interact with a hypothetical,
4rational opponent who would always choose the payoﬀ-maximizing strategy (motivations for such
experimental design are given in section 3).
We brieﬂy list and describe each of them in sequence:
1. Iterated Dominance
The following bimatrix illustrates the game:
Insert table 1 about here
In the game (see Warglien, Devetag and Legrenzi, 1998), the COLUMN player has a dominant
strategy, C. If the ROW player realizes this, she should play B. The game is then solvable by one
step of iterated dominance, and the unique equilibrium solution is (B,C). However, if the ROW
player does not realize that her opponent has a dominant strategy, or if she is uncertain about
the opponent’s rationality, she may be tempted to choose A to assure herself a sure gain of 60. In
a previous experiment on this game, 70% of the ROW players had chosen the ‘safe’ strategy A,
against the 30% who had picked the correct dominance-solvable equilibrium solution Y. These
data might be interpreted either as the result of excessive risk-aversion on the part of the ROW
players, or, at least in part, by the fact that some of the ROW players simply did not realize that
their opponent basically ‘had no choice’, because they did not focus on their opponent’s available
strategies and payoﬀs before deciding their own strategy. In other words, some of the players
may not perform the single step of iterated reasoning that the game solution would require. In
a de-biasing treatment (Warglien, Devetag and Legrenzi, 1998), subjects were explicitly asked
to formulate a belief about the opponent’s most likely move before deciding; in this treatment,
the percentage of subjects picking the correct choice raised up to 70%, thus giving some support
to the hypothesis that subjects in the control treatment did not focus spontaneously on their
opponent’s likely choice before deciding, but when prompted to do so, they were able to perform
5on step of iterated reasoning correctly. Evidence on violations of even one or few steps of iterated
dominance abounds in the experimental literature (see Camerer, 2000, ch. 5 for a review); the
choice of this particular example of payoﬀ matrix should eliminate all those instances in which
violation of dominance occurs because of the existence of social preferences (like, for example,
cooperation in the PD). Furthermore, telling subjects that their opponent is a payoﬀ-maximizing
algorithm should likewise eliminate choices caused by uncertainty in the opponent’s level of ra-
tionality.
2. Common Knowledge: The “Dirty Faces” Game
This game is another example to test our subjects’ performance in tasks requiring iterated steps
of reasoning. The game takes its name from a story originally developed by Littlewood (1953),
and it is often cited in discussions about common knowledge of rationality (e.g., Geanakoplos,
1994; Binmore and Brandenburger, 1990). In the experiment we used a modiﬁed version drawn
by Fagin et al. (1995). In this version of the story, two children are playing with mud, and they
both get “dirty faces”; each child can see the other child’s dirty face but not his own. The baby
sitter arrives suddenly and announces: “At least one of you has a dirty face. Don’t talk! You can
only talk to answer this question: “Do you have a dirty face?” If you tell the truth, you won’t be
punished”. The two children both remain silent, and the baby-sitter then repeats the question.
At this point, both children respond that they have a dirty face and avoid to be punished. In
fact, both children can see the other’s dirty face, and common knowledge that at least one of
them has a dirty face results from the baby-sitter’s announcement. Then each child is able to
infer from the other child’s silence that he himself has a dirty face (in fact, if he didn’t have
a dirty face, the other child would have immediately inferred that his own face was dirty after
the baby-sitter’s announcement and he would have confessed it). Restated in game-theoretic
jargon, both players can be of one of two types, X and Y, and they both have an incentive to
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know their type with certainty. Common knowledge that at least one of the players is of type
X assures to players that they can infer their type by observing the actions of others in the ﬁrst
round of play (confessing or remaining silent). The best outcome for both players is to confess in
the second round. However, two requirements are necessary in order for this outcome to occur:
common knowledge that at least one player is of type X, and common knowledge of rationality.
Each player must hence perform a series of iterated reasoning steps to arrive at the solution.
Weber (2001) tested experimentally a modiﬁed version of the game, varying group size, the
number of required steps of iterated reasoning, and allowing repeated play to test learning. He
found that, while the majority of subjects conform to the theoretical prediction in the simplest
case, the observed percentage of behavior consistent with theory sharply declines as more steps
of reasoning are required. In addition, he found no group size eﬀect and no signiﬁcant evidence
of learning even after nine rounds of play. In our experiments we used the hypothetical story
above described, and gave subjects three possible answers, stating that only one of the three was
the correct one.
3. Backward Induction: A Simple Game Tree
In the game (see ﬁg. 1), our experimental subject is the ﬁrst mover.
Insert ﬁg. 1 about here
The rational strategy for player 1 is to choose STOP; in fact, the game is solvable through
backward induction, by which players start at the end of the game tree, and ‘prune’ it by suc-
cessively eliminating dominated moves. If YOU have a chance to move in the last round, you
would choose A assuring a gain of 30 for YOU and 10 for the OTHER; however, the OTHER,
knowing that, would choose STOP in round 2, assigning a payoﬀ of 20 to herself and 10 to you.
Hence, YOU should stop the game in the ﬁrst round to gain of payoﬀ of 20. The game’s unique
7sub-game perfect equilibrium is in fact (STOP, STOP). However, if subjects do not perform the
reasoning sequence correctly, they might be tempted to choose PASS to get the payoﬀ of 30 in
the last round. The game was never tested in previous experiments, although there is substan-
tial evidence of heterogeneity and boundedly rational behavior in similar sequential games (e.g.,
Schotter, Weigelt and Wilson, 1994; Camerer, Johnson, Rymon and Sen, 2002).
3 Experimental Design
In this preliminary experimental study, subjects did not play the games against one another,
but with a hypothetical, rational opponent that was programmed to always choose the payoﬀ-
maximizing strategy in each game. Since in each of the games there is only one optimal strategy
for the opponent, we told subjects that they could imagine playing against a computer, but that
in reality a payoﬀ-maximizing algorithm would be applied to determine their opponents’ choice,
and hence their payoﬀ would be determined with certainty once they had made their choice.
The reasons of this choice of experimental strategy are twofold: ﬁrst, we wanted our subjects
to be motivated only by ﬁnancial reward and not by other drives such as altruism, reciprocity,
fairness, etc. In addition, we intended to rule out forms of sophisticated behavior induced by
the belief that one’s opponent may be irrational, revengeful, etc. Although proposing game-
theoretic tasks in the form of hypothetical questions rather than as real interactive situations is
an experimental design certainly more familiar to psychologists than to experimental economists,
there is increasing evidence that in several cases results do not diﬀer much among the two
procedures (e.g., Rubinstein, 1999)1.
A total of 67 subjects participated in the experiment. They were all undergraduate students
who enrolled by responding to ads posted at the department buildings. The experiment was
in form of a questionnaire and was conducted with paper and pencil at the Computable and
1For a discussion on methodological diﬀerences between psychologists and experimental economists and their
implications see Camerer (1996).
8Experimental Economics Lab of the University of Trento. Before the experiment started, we
conducted separately on each subject the standard Wechsler digit span test for short term memory
capacity (e.g., Walsch and Betz, 1990). This simple test consists in asking subjects to repeat
a series of digits which are to be read by the experimenter at the rate of one digit per second.
The test is conducted sequentially on two independent sets of digit series of increasing length.
For each set, the test stops when the participant fails to correctly repeat a given series. The
subject’s ‘score’ in each set is given by the length of the last series that was repeated correctly
(so, for example, if a subject fails to correctly repeat a series of length 6, her score will be equal
to 5). The subject’s ﬁnal score is then given by the higher among the two scores that were
achieved in the sets. Although the score needs not directly reﬂect the number of ‘short-term
memory slots’ available to an individual, it is generally assumed that higher scores correspond
to a higher short-term memory capacity. After the test was taken, subjects received a sheet with
instructions for the experiment (a translation of the instructions is available in Appendix). After
reading the instructions, subjects were given a questionnaire with the three games mixed with
other, unrelated questions. They were paid an amount of e3 for participation plus anything
they could earn in the experiment for a total maximum of e25. The experiment lasted 45-50
minutes on average. Average earnings in the experiment were equal to e21.3. Subjects had no
time limit to make their choice in the games.
4 Results
Our main research hypothesis is the existence of a correlation between a subject’s score in the
memory test and her conformity to theoretical predictions in the games.
Former attempts at eliciting behavioral strategies in games have revealed a bewildering variety
of individual decision rules (e.g., Rapoport, Seale and Winter, 2000; Seale and Rapoport, 2000
among many). Notwithstanding such variety, we expect that, on average, STM constraints will
aﬀect subjects’ ability to make optimal choices. Loosely speaking, there are two possibilities.
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capacity; the resulting memory stress may be a source of crash in their execution, thus leading to
errors. Alternatively, individuals may adapt (often by a process of trial-and-error) their decision
rules to their own capacity constraints; such simpliﬁed decision rules may occasionally lead to
correct choices, but on average will produce inaccurate responses. In both cases, it is reasonable
to expect that more stringent STM constraints will increase the probability of errors. However,
given the high variability in individual decision rules, we expect a high variance in responses in
each single task, which may be absorbed as behavior in diﬀerent tasks is aggregated2.
Therefore, we have calculated the total number of correct responses in the three tasks for each
subject (i.e., their cumulated score). Figure 2 reports the average cumulated score for each class
of STM score (ranging from 5 to 8). The ﬁgure clearly shows a positive relation between average
correct responses and STM capacity. We also computed the correlation coeﬃcient between
individual cumulated score and STM score. Table 2 reports the values of the two standard
Kendall’s taub and Spearman’s rho correlation coeﬃcients.
Insert Fig. 2 about here
Insert table 2 about here
This result is encouraging: the table shows a positive and highly signiﬁcant correlation be-
tween these two variables, suggesting that STM actually matters in determining average perfor-
mance, notwithstanding the relevance of other sources of heterogeneity that cannot be captured
2In a discussion of problem solving in crypt-arithmetic tasks, Simon remarks that:“Diﬀerent subjects do
indeed apply diﬀerent strategies ...But apart from the strategies, the only hu man characteristic that exhibits
itself strongly in the crypt-arithmetic task is the limited size of short-term memory. Subjects get into trouble
simply because they forget where they are, what assignments they have made previously, and what assumptions
are implicit in assignments they have made conditionally.” (Simon, 1981, pp. 62-63).
10by our experimental design. Hence, the evidence found by Simon (1978; 1989) regarding the
domain of individual problem-solving seems to apply also to interactive decision-making.
We then conducted the same analysis for each task separately. Figures 3, 4, and 5 report the
frequencies of correct responses in each task as a function of the STM class. Two tasks (“dirty
faces” and “iterated dominance”) show the expected monotonic relation, although with a ﬂatten-
ing in correspondence of STM 6 and 7 in the “iterated dominance” case, while in the game-tree
case, there is an unexpected peak in correspondence of the lowest STM value (notice, however,
that the sample size of this STM class is the smallest one). We then computed nonparametric
correlation coeﬃcients between STM score and response in each task separately (see table 3).
Insert Fig. 3, 4 and 5 about here
Insert table 3 about here
As expected, results on individual correlations are weaker, with the only exception of the
“dirty faces” game.
Some observations are noteworthy regarding the evaluation of our results: ﬁrstly, subjects in
our experiments did not have any time constraints to make their choices, and the stimuli were
constantly under their eyes. It is well know that these two conditions considerably dilute the
eﬀects of STM constraints (Baddeley, 1990). We chose this design, even though adverse to our
hypothesis, because we wanted to disentangle the mere eﬀects of remembering the task’s relevant
information from that of remembering the intermediate steps of iterated reasoning required to
make a decision, which is the main focus of our study. Secondly, the higher correlation observed
between STM score and performance in the “dirty faces” task compared to the other tasks can
be partly explained by our choice of an STM scoring test which is based on the phonological
11loop ’(Baddeley, 1990), measuring verbal STM performance. This particular measure neglects all
visual components of STM. While the “dirty faces” task was presented to subjects in an entirely
verbal form, the other two tasks were both supported by a graphical representation (i.e., a payoﬀ
matrix and a game-tree), that might have been used also as a support to the reasoning process.
In our experiment, we didn’t measure the visual STM capacity; we conjecture that a combined
use of visual and auditory STM measures would provide a better insight into these phenomena.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this study we made a ﬁrst attempt at exploring the link between short-term memory con-
straints and behavior in strategic settings. Our preliminary results seem to capture the existence
of a relation, suggesting that short term memory capacity limits may indeed be a relevant source
- though of course not the only one - of bounded rationality in games as well as in individual
problem solving tasks, as Simon has extensively argued.
Further research should involve the use of protocol analysis to gain insight into the behav-
ioral strategies that subjects adopt: in fact, an interesting research direction, in our view, should
aim at identifying how STM constraints impact on the decision process, whether by simply af-
fecting the probability of making ‘mistakes’ at some stage of the iterated reasoning process, or,
more radically, by inducing subjects to the use of simpliﬁed rules of thumb as substitutes of
more complex decision strategies. Even more radically, STM constraints may aﬀect the mental
representation that individuals construct of a strategic interaction situation: In a related ex-
perimental paper (Warglien, Devetag and Legrenzi, 1998) we suggest that individuals often use
simpliﬁed representations of games that assimilate them to lotteries, allowing the application of
‘naive’ heuristics that neglect the most important characteristic of a strategic setting: the need
to take into consideration the other players’ motivations and preferences. Whether the switch to
simpliﬁed representations is determined by underlying memory constraints is an open question.
These combined research directions could contribute to explain, at least in part, the behavioral
12heterogeneity observed in experiments and which is usually accounted for in the literature by
assuming a multiplicity of players’ types. Types are usually assumed to diﬀer by the beliefs
they hold about the types of others, which in turn determine the decision rule adopted, so that
quite often observed violations of equilibrium predictions are explained as best responses to such
beliefs. It would be worthwhile to investigate whether and to what extent such diﬀerences in
decision rules derive instead from an underlying computational bound.
6 Appendix: Instructions
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment on decision making; if you follow
instructions carefully and make appropriate decisions, you will be able to earn an appreciable
amount of money, which will be paid to you privately and in cash at the end of the experiment.
In the following you will be presented with a series of interactive decision making situations, in
which your potential payoﬀ will depend on your choice as well as the choice of your opponent.
These interactive situations will be called ‘games’.
In all the games that will be presented to you, we ask you to imagine being paired with
an opponent who is exclusively interested in trying to maximize his/her payoﬀ, without being
motivated by other concerns such as altruism, revenge, etc. besides, he/she imagines that you
are behaving in the same way. If you think it’s easier, you can imagine the other player as
a computer; in reality, the moves of your opponent will be determined by an algorithm that
maximizes the opponent’s expected payoﬀ in every game.
Furthermore, keep in mind that, while in common language the term “game” is usually used
to denote purely competitive situations in which there is a winner and a loser, in the games
presented here this will not necessarily be the case. In other words, there will be games in which
both you and your opponent can earn less or more depending on the choices you make. Your
earnings in the game will be expressed in a hypothetical currency which we call schillings. A
schilling will be converted into euros at the rate of e.12 per schilling. Your total earnings in
13the games will be determined by the sum of your earnings in each game, and the corresponding
amount will be paid to you privately and in cash at the end of the experiment. Upon request,
you will be allowed to verify that your earnings have been calculated correctly (there is only
one optimal choice for your opponent in every game, hence your earnings are determined with
certainty once you have made your choice).
In all the game you will have a certain role which will be speciﬁed to you. The games will be
presented to you in three possible forms: in verbal form, in form of a payoﬀ matrix, and in form
of a game-tree.
Games in form of a payoﬀ matrix:
A payoﬀ matrix is a convenient way to represent simultaneous games, i.e., games in which both
you and your opponent must choose your actions without knowing what the other will choose
before making your own choice. A payoﬀ matrix is simply a table with a certain number of ROWS
and COLUMNS. Usually, one of the players (the ROW player) is designated to choose one among
the ROWS, while the other (the COLUMN player) can choose one among the COLUMNS. The
cells inside the table report the earnings (in schillings) that both of you get in correspondence of
every possible combination of your two decisions.
For example, in the following table the ROW player can choose among ROWS A and B,
while the COLUMN player can choose among COLUMNS C and D. At the intersection between
the row chosen by the row player and the column chosen by the column player one can read the
payoﬀs that each of them gets; remember that the ﬁrst number always indicates the row player’s
payoﬀ, while the second number indicates the column player’s payoﬀ.
Insert table 4 about here
Remember that you can never choose directly the cell, but only the row or column. To help
14your comprehension of a payoﬀ matrix, you can imagine it analogous to a cartesian plan, in
which one of the players can choose a value on the x-axis, and the other can choose a value on
the y-axis. The intersection between the two identiﬁes a point (i.e., the cell).
You will have the role of the ROW player. You will only have to read instructions carefully,
think through the payoﬀ table and then choose the row you prefer, imagining that the other
player has identical information (except that he knows he’s the column player), and knows that
both of you have the same information.
Games in form of tree:
The tree-form is usually used to represent sequential games, i.e., games in which players move
in sequence after having observed what the other has done. An example of a game tree is shown
below:
In this game player 1 moves ﬁrst, and can choose between two actions (the ‘branches’ of
the tree), A and B. If she chooses A, the game stops and the two players receive the payoﬀs in
parenthesis (the ﬁrst number denotes player 1’s payoﬀ). If she chooses B, the it’s player 2’s turn
to move, and she can choose between C and D. Here, like in the matrix case, you have to think
carefully through the information contained in the game tree, and then choose the action you
prefer, knowing that your opponent has the same information, and that she will observe your
move before making hers.
You will have no time limit to make your choices. we ask you to think carefully and do the
experiment in silence. If you have question, please raise your hand and the experimenter will
come to you. Thank you for your collaboration.
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Table 1: A game solvable by iterated dominance
Correlation coeﬃcient Signiﬁcance (1-tailed)
Kendall’s taub :248 :010
Spearman’s rho :287 :009
Table 2: Correlation coeﬃcients between individual STM score and cumulated score in the
experiment
19It. Dom. ‘Dirty Faces’ Game Tree
corr. coeﬀ. sig. corr. coeﬀ. sig. corr. coeﬀ. sig.
Kendall’s taub .147 .098 .203 .037 .152 .091
Spearman’s rho .159 .099 .219 .037 .164 .092
























Fig. 1: a sequential game solvable by backward induction Fig. 2: frequencies of correct responses in the three tasks for classes of STM score 

















yFig. 3: frequency of correct responses for classes of STM score in the iter. dom. task
Fig. 4: frequency of correct responses for classes of STM score in the `dirty faces' task




















































































































yFig. 5: frequency of correct responses for classes of STM score in the game-tree task
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